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Note
An Act-Based Analysis of Immunity and Its
Application to Unconstitutional Acts
of Court Clerks
Claire E. Harkrider
Errors by court clerks can create serious consequences.
For example, a state district court granted Thad Lowe's peti-
tion for release from jail,' but Lowe spent three additional
weeks in jail because the court clerk intentionally failed to no-
tify him of the order,2 thereby violating Lowe's constitutional
right to liberty. In another case, a court clerk refused to send
Frank Marcedes a transcript of the criminal proceedings
against him.3 As a result, the court clerk violated Marcedes's
constitutional right of access to the courts. In spite of the con-
sequences of court clerk errors such as these, some courts
would prohibit Lowe and Marcedes from recovering damages
by granting the clerks immunity from civil liability.
4
Court clerks play an important role in the judicial process.5
Under the law, court clerks are considered records custodians.
6
They enter judgments, notify parties of the entry of judgments,
administer oaths, receive and keep money, control and disburse
funds, and file pre-trial and post-trial motions and pleadings.
7
Because the Supreme Court has made judges,8 witnesses,9
1. Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Id-
3. Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir. 1971).
4. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
5. A court clerk, also known as a prothonotary, is a public official whose
appointment is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions. For an
overview of court clerks and their office, appointment, eligibility require-
ments, qualifications, term of office including tenure and removal, compensa-
tion, powers, duties, and liabilities, see 15A AM. JUP. 2D Clerks of Court §§ 1-38
(1976).
6. See, e.g., MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-201(a)(1) (1989).
7. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (listing some court clerk
duties).
8. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
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jurors,'0 grand jurors,"- and prosecutors 2 absolutely immune
from liability, frustrated criminal defendants and civil litigants
have looked for constitutional violations 3 by court clerks to
vindicate their rights and seek damages. 14 In 1991 alone, nine
cases addressing court clerk immunity reached the federal ap-
pellate level.' 5 The Supreme Court has not considered court
9. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983).
10. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275
U.S. 503 (1927).
11. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976).
12. Id. at 423.
13. Plaintiffs also sue court clerks for damages arising out of negligence
and defamation claims. See, e.g., 15A AM. JuP. 2D Clerks of Court § 28 (1976);
Liabilities for Negligence or Misconduct, 1981-1986 NINTH DECENTENNIAL DI-
GEST § 72, at 222-23. This Note, however, limits its discussion to constitutional
violations.
14. The court in Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert denied, 494 U.S. 1085 (1990), stated that a danger exists that "disappointed
litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge
directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial ad-
juncts." Id. (quoting Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 956 (1989)).
15. The Ninth Circuit alone heard six of the nine cases regarding court
clerk immunity. See Franzen v. Wright, No. 91-15181, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
26618, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1493 (1992); Fixel v.
United States, No. 90-15739, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18366, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug.
5, 1991); Sands v. Arizona Supreme Court, No. 90-15897, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
18046, at *2 (9th Cir. July 31, 1991); Balawajder v. Williams, No. 90-15167, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 18066, at *1 (9th Cir. July 29, 1991); Robinson v. Cawthorne,
No. 90-4013, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10336, at *2 (6th Cir. May 4, 1991); Ad-
dleman v. Merritt, No. 90-35474, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4844, at *4 (9th Cir.
March 20, 1991); Kukes v. Vandervoort, No. 89-16280, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
3469, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2267 (1991); McKin-
ney v. Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991); X. v. Casey, No. 90-667,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991).
Since 1967, 37 cases on court clerk immunity, including those decided in
1991, have reached the various courts of appeals. See Ching v. Moffard, No. 89-
16331, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18872 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 1990); Badea v. Bowman,
No. 89-16060, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18769 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1990); Ferdik v.
Allen, No. 90-15382, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18823 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1990); Page
v. Albertson, No. 89-2256, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16045 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 564 (1990); Mwonyonyi v. Gieszl, No. 89-5495, 1990 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2048 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 1990); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.
1988); Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1988); Eades v. Sterlinske,
810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Lowe v. Let-
singer, 772 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1985); McCaw v. Winter, 745 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.
1984); Green v. Mario, 722 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1983); LeGrand v. Evan, 702 F.2d
415 (2d Cir. 1983); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981); Henriksen v.
Bentley, 644 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163 (1st
Cir. 1980); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1980); Morrison v. Jones,
607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980); Shipp v. Todd,
568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978); McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.
COURT CLERK IMMUNITY
clerk immunity.
This Note considers whether and to what extent court
clerks should be entitled to immunity from civil liability for
damages arising from unconstitutional acts. Part I sets forth
the legal principles and policies underlying immunity, demon-
strates the interaction between immunity and constitutional
claims, and discusses the role of court clerks in the judicial pro-
cess. Part II reviews the circuit courts of appeals' divergent
conclusions regarding court clerk immunity. Drawing from
Supreme Court precedent on immunity for public officials, Part
III argues that immunity should depend on the nature of the
contested act of the court clerk. Court clerks should not be
granted immunity for their ministerial acts. Rather, immunity
from civil liability is appropriate only when the clerk performs
a discretionary act or when the clerk acts pursuant to a judge's
order.
I. IMMUNITY
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND PoLIcY JUSTIFICATIONS
UNDERLYING IMMUNITY
1. Legal Principles Governing Immunity
Immunity16 is an affirmative defense17 that protects an in-
dividual from liability for alleged wrongful conduct. In general,
immunity attaches to the particular act performed by the offi-
cial, not to the official's title.
18
1974); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); McCray v. Maryland,
456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1971); Da-
vis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1970); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969); Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761 (7th
Cir. 1969); Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Dunne,
409 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1968).
16. Black's Law Dictionary defines immunity to be "[e]xemption... from
... performing duties which the law generally requires other citizens to per-
form." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990).
17. To benefit from immunity, the defendant must plead immunity.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Although an immunity defense
is an affirmative defense, the plaintiff must anticipate the immunity defense.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed
Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights
Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 958-59 (1990) (advocating limited
discovery).
18. Thus, an official may receive absolute, qualified, or no immunity, de-
pending on the act performed. Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351,
364 (1978) (providing a judge with absolute immunity for ordering sterilization
of a minor) with Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) (holding that a
1992] 1395
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The Supreme Court has recognized two levels of immu-
nity1 9 for public officials: absolute20 and qualified.2 ' Both
levels of immunity protect only discretionary acts performed by
public officials.22 Thus, immunity will not protect public offi-
cials who perform nondiscretionary or so-called ministerial
acts.23 A public officer may also be entitled to derivative immu-
nity. Under this doctrine, officials otherwise not immune are
judge was not absolutely immune from damages resulting from his discrimina-
tory discharge of female probation officer); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 521
(holding that even though the Attorney General would have been absolutely
immune in his prosecutorial function, he was not absolutely immune in a
§ 1983 action when performing his national security function). But see Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744-58 (1982) (holding that presidential immunity is
awarded based on the title of the official).
19. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1981).
20. Id Both statutes and state and federal constitutions also may grant
immunity. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing that members of Con-
gress are absolutely immune for any speech, debate, vote, representation or ac-
tivity done in session); MINN. STAT. § 60A.031(9)(a) (Supp. 1991) ("No cause of
action shall arise nor shall liability be imposed against the commissioner ...
for statements made or conduct performed in good faith while carrying out the
provisions of this section."); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 & n.5
(1951) (listing 41 states which have the equivalent of the Speech and Debate
Clause in their state constitutions).
21. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. Qualified immunity is also known as good
faith immunity. Id at 815.
22. Id- at 816 ("Immunity generally is available only to officials perform-
ing discretionary functions."); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (not-
ing that some form of immunity is required to protect officials who are
required to exercise their discretion). In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court ex-
plained why immunity is available to those public officials who exercise
discretion:
When government officials abuse their offices, "action[s] for damages
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees." ... [P]ermitting damages suits against government offi-
cials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of
personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly in-
hibit officials in the discharge of their duties. Our cases have accom-
modated these conflicting concerns by generally providing
government officials performing discretionary functions with a quali-
fied immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as
their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated.
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
23. Ministerial acts are those which give the officer no power to judge the
matter to be done. See Morgan v. Yuba County, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) (explaining that a "discretionary act" is an act which requires
"personal deliberation, decision and judgment," but a ministerial act "amounts
only to an obedience to orders, or the performance of a duty in which the of-
ficer is left no choice of his own"); see also Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon,
348 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that when a statutory command ad-
dressed to the public official is unmistakable, the official's duty to comply with
the statutory command is ministerial).
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granted derivative immunity for acts performed at the request
of an official entitled to immunity.24
Absolute immunity provides complete protection from
suit,2s regardless of the intent or malice behind the allegedly
wrongful act.2 6 For example, a judge who erroneously convicts
a defendant is immune from civil liability even if the judge con-
victed the defendant knowing that the defendant was innocent.
In contrast, qualified immunity protects public officials
from civil liability only if the law governing the conduct is un-
clear, such that the official did not know that he or she was vio-
lating the individual's constitutional rights.2 7 Officials are not
immune if they fail to follow a clear legal standard.2 8 For ex-
ample, an attorney general who authorizes a warrantless wire-
tap would be immune from civil liability under the doctrine of
qualified immunity if the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that
24. Circuit courts of appeals agree that an official performing an unconsti-
tutional act at the request of a judge or in compliance with a court order de-
serves some form of immunity, but these courts disagree on whether it should
be absolute or qualified. For example, the Fourth Circuit has granted absolute
immunity to those officials who act pursuant to a judge's order even though
those officials would have been liable had they acted on their own. See Mc-
Cray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972). Other circuits have reached the
same conclusion. See Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988);
Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632
F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969). But see Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1018
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that clerks are immune from suit under the doctrine of
qualified immunity when acting pursuant to a judicial order).
25. A court will dismiss a complaint against a public officer entitled to ab-
solute immunity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
26. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
27. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Prior to Harlow, offi-
cials claiming qualified immunity needed to meet objective and subjective re-
quirements. Id. In Harlow, however, the Court rejected the subjective
element of good-faith intent, finding it incompatible with the goal of ensuring
that insubstantial claims do not proceed to trial. Id. at 815-16. The Court
noted that the subjective qualified immunity standard did not protect an offi-
cial from suit because the official's good faith was a question of fact which he
would have to establish at trial. Id. at 816. By rejecting the subjective element
of the qualified defense, the Court thus changed the qualified immunity stan-
dard from one which only protected an official from ultimate liability to one
which protects an official from suit. Id. at 817-18.
28. The immunity defense ordinarily fails where the law was clearly es-
tablished because reasonably competent public officials should know the law
governing their own conduct. Id. at 818-19. Officials may, however, be able to
show extraordinary circumstances to explain why they neither knew nor
should have known the relevant legal standard. Id.
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a warrantless wiretap is unconstitutional or the lower federal
courts had not consistently decided the issue.29
2. Policy Justifications For Immunity
The immunity defense protects officials from threats of
personal liability that may inhibit them from exercising in-
dependent discretion to perform their jobs properly.30 For
most public officials, qualified immunity is sufficient to protect
their exercise of discretion.3 ' The Supreme Court has con-
cluded, however, that absolute immunity is necessary to protect
discretionary acts performed by many participants in the judi-
cial process. 32
The Supreme Court cites two factors to justify absolutelyimmunizing participants in the judicial process. First, the
Court reasons that discretionary acts performed by a judicial of-
ficer3 3 are so important to society that judicial officers should
be able to take action without fear of liability.34 The Supreme
Court has observed that "[i]t is a general principle of the high-
est importance to the proper administration of justice that a ju-
29. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530-35 (1985).
30. The Supreme Court has stated:
Suits for monetary damages are meant to compensate the victims of
wrongful actions and to discourage conduct that may result in liabil-
ity. Special problems arise, however, when government officials are
exposed to liability for damages. To the extent that the threat of lia-
bility encourages these officials to carry out their duties in a lawful
and appropriate manner, and to pay their victims when they do not, it
accomplishes exactly what it should. By its nature, however, the
threat of liability can create perverse incentives that operate to in-
hibit officials in the proper performance of their duties .... When
officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant
to their official duties, they may well ... skew their decisions in ways
that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent
criteria that ought to guide their conduct.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988).
31. See Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939 (1991) ("The presumption is
that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect govern-
ment officials in the exercise of their duties."); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (ex-
plaining that qualified immunity represents the norm for executive officials
and stating that only those officials whose special functions or constitutional
status require complete protection from suit are entitled to absolute
immunity).
32. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
33. Judicial officers include both officers appointed by the court and other
citizen participants in the judicial process, such as grand jurors, petit jurors,
and witnesses. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (defining
judicial officers as those participants in the judicial process whose exercise of
judgment is functionally equivalent to judges).
34. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
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dicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be
free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself."' 'a The second factor justify-
ing immunity in the judicial sphere is the Court's belief that
procedural safeguards in the judicial process reduce the need
for private redress of constitutional wrongs.36 These safeguards
include the importance of precedent in resolving controversies,
the adversarial nature of the judicial process, and the ability to
correct error on appeal.37 Because these safeguards exert suffi-
cient control over a judicial officer's action, the threat of civil
liability is not necessary to deter wrongful behavior by judicial
officers.
B. IMmuNITIEs AND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
1. The Significance of 1871
Plaintiffs may sue state public officials for constitutional
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is derived from Section
I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.38 Federal public officials simi-
larly are liable in Bivens actions.39 Section 1983 provides a
cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by every per-
son acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory. '40 The statute's
plain language4 ' appears to create a cause of action against
35. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
36. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 548 (1967)
(describing the origins of § 1983).
39. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), estab-
lished that a plaintiff has an action under the Constitution for money damages
against persons acting under color of federal authority but in violation of the
Constitution.
40. Section 1983 provides in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
41. The legislative 1 istory of § 1983 supports "the expansive sweep of the
statutory language." Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-36
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every person who has violated the "Constitution and laws," re-
gardless of whether the person was entitled to any common law
immunities. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that in
enacting § 1983, Congress did not abrogate immunities which
were "firmly rooted" in the common law because it did not ex-
pressly state any intent to do so.42
This view led the Supreme Court to develop the following
three-stage inquiry to determine what level of immunity,43 if
any, state and federal" public officials may use as a defense to
a § 1983 action. First, the Court considers the level of common
law immunity that was available to the official in a tort action
in 187145 and whether the immunity was "firmly rooted."' '
Second, the Court, because it is unwilling to assume that Con-
(1980). The opponents of § 1983 noted its lack of limitations during congres-
sional debates before enactment. Id. at 636 n.17.
42. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1985) ("We reemphasize that our
role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a
freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress'
intent by the common-law tradition .... ."); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) ("It is by now well settled that the tort liability
created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.... [The 42d
Congress] likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent spe-
cific provisions to the contrary.").
43. "Level" refers to absolute versus qualified immunity.
44. Federal public officials are entitled to immunity for their unconstitu-
tional acts to the same extent as state officials performing the same job. Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
950 F.2d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991), petition for cert filed, (U.S. Mar. 11, 1992)
(No. 91-7604).
45. Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1941 (1991); Malley, 475 U.S. at 339-40
(citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984)); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
34 (1983). In Burns, the court held that a state prosecutor was absolutely im-
mune from liability for damages under § 1983 for participating in a probable
cause hearing, 111 S. Ct. at 1942, but was not absolutely immune for giving
legal advice to the police. Id. at 1944-45. The Supreme Court based its holding
on the existence of common law immunity both before and after 1871 which
immunized prosecutors from liability for making false or defamatory state-
ments in judicial proceedings and for eliciting false and defamatory testimony
from witnesses. Id. at 1941. Similarly, the Court concluded that the prosecu-
tor was not immune for advising the police because "neither respondent nor
the court below has identified any historical or common-law support for ex-
tending absolute immunity to such actions by prosecutors." Id. at 1942.
46. In Owen v. City of Independence, the Court said:
[N]otwithstanding § 1983's expansive language and the absence of any
express incorporation of common-law immunities, we have, on several
occasions, found that a tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in
the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that
"Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
the doctrine."
445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
555 (1967)).
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gress intended to "freeze into permanent law whatever princi-
ples were current in 1871," determines whether "the prevailing
view on some point of general tort law ha[s] changed substan-
tially in the intervening century."47 Third, the Court considers
whether the original policy justifications supporting the availa-
bility or non-availability of immunity at common law furthers
the purposes of § 1983.48
Scholars49 and jurists50 have attacked this inquiry into the
common law of 1871 as too rigid, especially when the common
law rule prior to 1871 is not clear. As an alternative, Justice
47. Wade, 461 U.S. at 34 n.2. As a result, the Supreme Court will cite
cases both before and after 1871 to support the existence or non-existence of a
historical tradition of common law immunity. See id. at 45 & n.12, 48 & n.13;
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (citing cases from 1854 to 1925 to
support the existence of a common-law tradition of qualified immunity for
school board members).
48. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340; see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342-44
(1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976).
49. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky offers two criticisms of an historically-
based approach to immunity under § 1983. See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTbON 403-04 (1989). First, an historical approach assumes that com-
mon law clearly stated the type of immunity available to public officials. I&r at
403. This is not always the case because the degree of immunity that courts
afforded to public officials varied among states. Id- at 404. Thus, majority and
dissenting opinions of immunity decisions will cite conflicting cases, noting the
existence or non-existence of immunity to support their positions. I. Second,
Chemerinsky questions the relevance of common law principles to modern
views of tort law, the Constitution, and individual rights. Id.
50. Justice O'Connor has stated-
This approach [of looking to the common law at 1871] makes sense
when there was a generally prevailing rule of common law, for then it
is reasonable to assume that Congressmen were familiar with that
rule and imagined that it would cover the cause of action that they
were creating. But when a significant split in authority existed, it
strains credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed that one view
rather than the other would govern. Particularly in a case like this
one, in which those interpreting the common law of 1871 must resort
to dictionaries in an attempt to translate the language of the late 19th
century into terms that judges of the late 20th century can under-
stand... [W]e cannot safely infer anything about congressional intent
from the divided contemporaneous judicial opinions.
Wade, 461 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In Wade,
the Court, looking to Congress's presumed intent in enacting § 1983, held that
a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the
defendant's conduct involves reckless or callous indifference because the com-
mon law, both in 1871 and now, allows recovery of punitive damages in tort
cases not only for actual malicious intent but also for reckless indifference to
the rights of others. Idr at 46-48. Justice Rehnquist dissented, asserting that
the Court should look only to 1871 law and that a jury may assess punitive
damages in a § 1983 action only when there was bad faith or improper motive
on the part of the defendant because that was the standard required for puni-
tive damages in common law before 1871. Id at 65-66, 84.
1992] 1401
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O'Connor has suggested that the Court focus on the policies un-
derlying § 1983 to determine which common law rule best ac-
cords with those policies.5 ' Justice O'Connor identifies
compensation of victims of constitutional violations and deter-
rence of further violations as the overriding policies of § 1983.52
She stated, however, that the goal of deterrence must be bal-
anced against the potential chill on public officials in the per-
formance of their duties.53 Recently, the Court has indicated
that it may not use the 1871 test to determine the scope of qual-
ified immunity.m
2. History of Immunity
a. Discretionary Acts
Prior to 1871, the common law provided that most public
officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their discre-
tionary acts.55 The following public officials, however, were en-
titled to absolute immunity if they performed discretionary acts
in the judicial process: judges,- witnesses, 57 jurors and grand
jurors.58 These common law rules remain the prevailing view
51. Wade, 461 U.S. at 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987), suggests that the Supreme Court will not apply the 1871 test to
determine the scope of qualified immunity. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45. Jus-
tice Scalia stated that, although it is true that the Court determines the scope
of immunity in light of common law tradition, "we have never suggested that
the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived
from the often arcane rules of the common law." Id. at 645.
55. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 411-13
(1880); see also Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1947 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that government servants who
performed official acts involving policy discretion had qualified immunity in
pre-1871 common law). In Burns, Justice Scalia cites a pre-1871 case, Billings
v. Lafferty, 31 IlM. 318, 322 (1863), which held that a court clerk was entitled to
qualified immunity, to support the notion that government servants who exer-
cise policy discretion were awarded qualified immunity before 1871. Id. How-
ever, most court clerk duties do not allow for discretion because they are
ministerial. In addition, the majority of pre-1871 courts provided no immunity
for the acts of court clerks. See infra notes 60-64, 131-40 and accompanying
text. Thus, Justice Scalia mischaracterized the duties of court clerks as discre-
tionary and chose one of the few cases which granted court clerks qualified
immunity for their acts.
56. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608), cited in Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
57. King v. Skinner, 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1772), cited in Briscoe v. La-
Hue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983).
58. Id.; see Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1926) (noting the exist-
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b. Ministerial Acts
Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1871, the
general common law provided that a public officer was not enti-
tled to immunity for ministerial acts.60 The few courts that
granted immunity to public officials for ministerial acts did so
by extending qualified immunity.61 Under the general rule,
however; a public officer was liable62 for omission, neglect, or
malfeasance63 in the performance of ministerial acts,6 and
most courts provided court clerks with no immunity for these
acts.65 After 1871, courts continued to apply this general rule.6
ence of common-law precedent extending absolute immunity to grand and
petit jurors), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (citing Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65
(1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872)).
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 505 (1978).
60. Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95 (1836) ("It would be a
most dangerous principle to establish, that the acts of a ministerial officer,
when done in good faith, however injurious to private rights, and unsupported
by law, should afford no ground for legal redress.... Where a ministerial of-
ficer acts in good faith for an injury done, he is not liable to exemplary dam-
ages; but he can claim no further exemption, where his acts are clearly against
law."); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 34, 38-42 (1866); Briggs v.
Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356, 358 (1813).
61. See, e.g., Billings v. Lafferty, 31 ]M. 318, 322 (1863); Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 559, 560 (1866).
62. When the injured party was contributorily negligent, however, the
public officer was not liable. See Parks v. Davis, 26 Iowa 20, 22 (1864).
63. Malfeasance has been defined as "a wrongful act which the actor has
no legal right to do; [or] as any wrongful conduct which affects, interrupts or
interferes with the performance of official duty; [or] as an act for which there
is no authority or warrant of law; [or] as an act which a person ought not to do
at all;... [or] as the unjust performance of some act which the party perform-
ing it has no right, or has contracted not, to do." Daugherty v. Ellis, 97 S.E.2d
33, 42 (W. Va. 1956) (citations omitted).
64. McNutt ex reL Moore v. Livingston, 15 Miss. (7 S. & M.) 641, 649-50
(1846) (holding that a court clerk performed a ministerial act and thus was not
entitled to immunity); see also State ex reL. McIntyre v. Merritt, 65 N.C. 558,
560 (1871) (holding court clerks liable for failure to perform official duty pro-
vided by law).
65. See infra notes 132-40 (listing cases).
66. See, e.g., Martin v. Bogard, 2 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ark. 1928); Riverside
Transfer Co. v. Service Drayage Co., 135 So. 79, 80 (La. Ct. App. 1931); Whelan
v. Reynolds, 112 N.W. 223, 224 (Minn. 1907). For a more complete listing of
cases, see infra notes 144-52. Several courts, however, have held that clerks
are qualifiedly immune and therefore liable for bad faith actions or malicious
disregard of duties. See, e.g., Hoyer v. Graham, 129 N.W. 317, 318 (Iowa 1911);
Brown v. Brown, 64 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).
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Gradually, however, some courts began to depart from the com-
mon law rule and grant absolute immunity to officers who per-
formed ministerial acts.67 However, because immunity is meant
to protect officials who exercise discretion and because, by defi-
nition, a ministerial act prohibits discretion, policy considera-
tions support withholding immunity for ministerial acts.
C. ROLE OF COURT CLERKS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
The majority of court clerks' duties are ministerial.68 A
ministerial act is one which does not require the exercise of
judgment and discretion in its performance.69 Although their
duties vary by jurisdiction, court clerks generally file or record
judgments, payments of fines, orders, and pleadings; issue ex-
ecutions of judgments; and approve appeal bonds. Statutes re-
quire that court clerks perform these acts.70
A court clerk also may perform discretionary acts when
mandated by a constitutional or legislative provision. For ex-
ample, a statute may empower a court clerk to issue criminal
warrants. To issue a warrant, a court clerk must exercise dis-
67. Although there is no clear turning point when courts began to award
absolute immunity to court clerks for ministerial acts, one of the early cases
was Allen v. Biggs, 62 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1945). In Biggs, the plaintiff sued
both the judge and the court clerk, alleging that he was deprived of his liberty
because the clerk delayed filing a writ of certiorari. I&i at 230. Concluding
that the judge was entitled to absolute immunity, and without discussing the
immunity of the clerk specifically, the court dismissed the action against both
the clerk and the judge. I& at 230-31.
Courts continue to split on whether court clerks should be absolutely im-
mune for ministerial acts. Compare Dalton v. Hysell, 381 N.E.2d 955, 956
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a court clerk is liable for negligently failing
to note the payment of a fine when the failure resulted in plaintiff's arrest)
and Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977) (indicating that a
court clerk is liable for negligent bookkeeping which resulted in plaintiff's
arrest because improper docketing was a ministerial act) with Zimmerman v.
Spears, 428 F. Supp. 759, 762 (W.D. Tex.) (holding that a court clerk is entitled
to absolute immunity when performing her duties), affl'd, 565 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1977) and Davis v. Quarter Sessions Court, 361 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (holding that court clerks are absolutely immune for failing to forward
transcript).
68. Midwestern Devs., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 319 F.2d 53, 53 (10th Cir. 1963)
(holding that a clerk is a ministerial officer); State ex reL Wanamaker v.
Miller, 128 N.E.2d 108, 109 (Ohio 1955) (same).
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., BANKR. R. 5005, 5006 (describing clerk's duty to accept filed
papers and to issue certified copy of record); IND. R. PRoc. 72 (listing duties of
trial courts and clerks); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1989) (set-
ting forth general duties of court clerks); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.3, 59.395 (West
1988 & Supp. 1991) (clerk of court's duties).
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cretion to determine whether probable cause exists.71
II. AVAILABILITY OF IMMUNITY TO COURT CLERKS
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Courts have not yet determined the appropriate level of
court clerk immunity. The Supreme Court has not considered
the issue, and the circuit courts are split.72 The Ninth Circuit
has concluded that court clerks are absolutely immune for min-
isterial acts,73 but other circuits have suggested that court
clerks may receive qualified immunity for ministerial acts.74
The opinions of the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits repre-
sent the three approaches that courts use in determining court
clerk immunity.
A. FOURTH Cmcurr
In McCray v. Maryland,75 the Fourth Circuit held that a
state court clerk was not entitled to absolute immunity for his
ministerial act in a § 1983 action.76 The plaintiff, a state pris-
oner, alleged that the clerk barred his access to the courts by
negligently filing the prisoner's petition for state post-convic-
tion relief.77
The McCray court used a two-part analysis to determine
whether the court clerk was entitled to absolute immunity.78
First, the court considered whether the policies behind absolute
immunity warranted granting it to court clerks performing
ministerial acts. 9 The court reasoned that absolute immunity
ensures that the threat of liability will not affect a public offi-
71. See, e.g., Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a court clerk was entitled to absolute immunity because he performed a
discretionary function normally handled by a judge), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832
(1984); City of Louisville v. Bergel, 610 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Ky. 1980) (holding that
the issuance of a warrant for arrest by the clerk is a judicial act requiring dis-
cretion, thereby making the court clerk immune).
72. See Forte v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting the split
among the circuit courts of appeal on the application of immunity to court
personnel).
73. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's test for immunity as applied to court clerks).
74. See infra notes 75-89, 100-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits' positions, respectively, on qualified immunity for
court clerks).
75. 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
76. Id- at 6.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id- at 3.
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cial's ability to make decisions.8 0 Thus, the court concluded
that it should grant the court clerk absolute immunity only if
the job requires discretion.81 Because a Maryland statute re-
quired the clerk to file petitions,8 2 the court determined that
the clerk's duty to file papers was mandatory and not discre-
tionary.8 3 Because the clerk lacked discretion, the threat of lia-
bility would not inhibit the clerk from performing his duties.84
Thus, the policies underlying absolute immunity would not
have been furthered in McCray.8
Second, the court focused on the fact that the plaintiff
brought his suit pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Be-
cause § 1983 makes "every person" who deprives another of her
constitutional rights under color of state law liable for damages,
the court ruled that only those immunities which existed at
common law could aid officials sued pursuant to § 1983.86 The
court concluded that because a state officer generally was not
immune for failure to perform a required ministerial act under
common law,8 7 the court clerk likewise was not immune88 The
court remanded the question of whether the court clerk was
entitled to qualified immunity.8 9
80. Id For example, granting judges absolute immunity fulfills the pur-
pose underlying absolute immunity because it allows judges to exercise their
discretion freely without the fear of liability for their actions. Id
81. Id at 4 (explaining that other participants in the judicial process are
entitled to absolute immunity when they perform discretionary duties similar
to those exercised by judges).
82. Id at 2.
83. Id at 4.
84. Id Additionally, a Maryland statute provided for a penalty of $200
against any court clerk who "neglectfully or willfully" failed to perform such
ministerial duties as making "proper entries of all proceedings in the court of
which he is a clerk." MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 32 (1957) (repealed 1973). The
court implied that the threat of liability would not inhibit the court clerk's
proper performance of his duties, given that the clerk would already be penal-
ized for failing to do so. McCray, 456 F.2d at 4.
85. McCray, 456 F.2d at 4.
86. Id at 3 (stating that courts must look at common law in 1871 to avoid
a "'judicial repeal' of the congressional purpose to make liable 'every person'
who under color of state law abridges a citizen's rights" (quoting Hoffman v.
Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959))).
87. Id. at 4. The court did not define what it meant by "common law," but
the earliest case cited to support the lack of immunity was from 1899. Id at 4
n.8.
88. Id at 4. The McCray court also remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the court clerk had acted pursuant to a judicial or court
order, noting that such an action would give the clerk qualified immunity. I&
at 5.
89. Id at 6. At the time of the McCray decision, the test for whether an
official was entitled to qualified immunity was whether the official acted in
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B. NINTH CiRcurr
In Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court,9° the Ninth
Circuit rejected the McCray court's reasoning and held that a
court clerk was absolutely immune for a ministerial act. In
Mullis, the plaintiff brought a Bivens action 91 against several
federal bankruptcy court clerks, alleging that the clerks had er-
roneously filed an incomplete bankruptcy petition under Chap-
ter 7 and later refused to accept an amended petition.92 The
Ninth Circuit held that court clerks are entitled to absolute im-
munity93 in civil rights actions when they perform acts that are
an integral part of the judicial process 94 and the acts were not
good faith. Since the McCray decision, however, the Supreme Court has
changed the standard for qualified immunity. See supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Supreme Court's changes to the qualified immunity
standard). The present inquiry for qualified immunity focuses on whether the
law was unclear, not on whether the public official took the action in good
faith.
90. 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988).
91. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining civil rights ac-
tions against federal officials).
92. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. Bankruptcy Rule 5005(a) provides that filing
bankruptcy papers is a statutory duty for court clerks.
93. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in An-
toine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991), petitionfor cert.
filed, (U.S. Mar. 11, 1992) (No. 91-7604), further develops the Ninth Circuit's
analysis regarding the availability of absolute immunity for acts which are an
integral part of the judicial process. In Antoine, the Ninth Circuit held that a
court reporter was absolutely immune for failing to produce a criminal trial
transcript because her acts were part of an adjudicatory function. Id. at 1476.
The court noted that absolute immunity is limited to actions that are either
"judicial or adjudicative." Id at 1475 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
229 (1987)). The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit's decision
in McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1974), which held that court
reporters were not entitled to absolute immunity because the reporters' duties
were ministerial, not discretionary. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1476 n.4.
The Ninth Circuit thus interpreted Forrester to confer absolute immunity
from damages for all acts carried out as a part of the judicial function, no mat-
ter how mechanical or routine the acts are. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of Forrester is too broad and thus incorrect. Although the Forrester Court ex-
cluded administrative acts such as employment decisions from the protection
of absolute immunity, the Court did not indicate that it was expanding abso-
lute immunity to include those ministerial acts traditionally exempt from ab-
solute immunity. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing
traditional exemptions for ministerial acts).
94. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390; see also Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a clerk of the United States Supreme Court was
absolutely immune because his activities were an integral part of the judicial
process). Other circuits have also adopted the "integral part of the judicial
process" test. See Mwonyonyi v. Gieszl, No. 89-5495, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
2048, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 1990); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir.
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performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. 95 The court's
analysis implies that the discretionary nature of the act does
not affect the status of immunity.9
Although it did not define the characteristics of those tasks
which are "an integral part of the judicial process," the court
held that the commencement of an action was such an act.
97
Under the second half of its test, the court concluded that the
clerks did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction because
the acts were within the general subject matter jurisdiction of
bankruptcy clerks.98 Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's decision to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
court clerks had absolute immunity.99
C. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has held that
court clerks are not entitled to absolute immunity for ministe-
rial acts. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit appears to have defined a ministerial act as an act of
omission rather than an act of commission.1°° The Seventh Cir-
cuit does not consider whether the act itself is discretionary.
10 1
1988) (per curiam); Tripati v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988);
Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen,
599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). But see Page v. Albertson, No.
89-2256, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16045, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1990) (holding
that the court clerks' alleged failure to file or assign plaintiff's motion
promptly might be characterized as administrative and thus may not be enti-
tled to absolute immunity).
95. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. The Supreme Court has made a distinction
between acts which are performed in clear absence of jurisdiction and those
performed in excess of jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 352 (1872).
96. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390; see also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a court clerk was entitled to absolute immunity
from damages in a § 1983 suit for issuing a warrant because the act was a truly
judicial act, regardless of whether discretion was involved).
97. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. The Second Circuit has stated that tasks "in-
tegrally related to the judicial process" share the following characteristics:
"the need for absolute immunity in order to permit the effective performance
of the function and the existence of safeguards against improper perform-
ance." Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1987).
98. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390.
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh
Circuit's omission/commission distinction).
101. See infra note 163 (noting that the Seventh Circuit, in Lowe and
Eades, held that clerks are not immune for failure to perform nondiscretion-
ary acts).
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The Seventh Circuit's decisions in Lowe v. Letsinger °2 and
Eades v. Sterlinske0 3 best illustrate the court's analysis. In
Lowe, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against a court clerk
for an act of omission, alleging that the clerk intentionally
withheld notice of an order vacating the plaintiff's convic-
tion, 0 4 causing the plaintiff to spend three additional weeks in
jail.'0 5 The Seventh Circuit held that the court clerk was not
entitled to absolute immunity but suggested that the clerk may
be entitled to qualified immunity.'06 The court explained that
court clerks are absolutely immune when they perform discre-
tionary acts similar to those performed by judges, such as set-
ting bail. 0 7 Therefore, the court held that the clerk was not
entitled to absolute immunity for his act of omission because
the clerk's duty to send notice after entry of judgment was a
ministerial task. 08 The court stated that the clerk may never-
theless be entitled to qualified immunity if he could show that
the law governing his conduct was unclear or if extraordinary
circumstances excused his wrongful conduct.'0 9 Because it was
"elementary" that a prisoner should be notified when a judg-
ment is entered on a post-conviction petition, the court thought
it unlikely that the clerk would be immune under the first
102. 772 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1985).
103. 810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
104. Lowe, 772 F.2d at 310.
105. Id at 312-13.
106. Id. at 313. The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Thompson v. Duke, 882
F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1988), and its interpretation of Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219 (1988), however, suggest that the Seventh Circuit might analyze the immu-
nity of a court clerk differently if it were now faced with the question of
whether a court clerk is absolutely immune. The Thompson court held that,
regardless of how mini terial a task was, those individuals who perform tasks
in the judicial system are entitled to absolute immunity. See Thompson, 882
F.2d at 1184. Accordingly, the court held that state officials responsible for a
delay in scheduling were absolutely immune because the scheduling of a hear-
ing is part of an adjudicatory or judicial function. Id. at 1185.
However, the Forrester Court did not provide a general definition of the
class of acts entitled to immunity, nor did it state that all individuals who per-
form acts which are part of an adjudicatory function are entitled to absolute
immunity. Instead, the Court relied on a functional analysis to determine
those officials entitled to absolute immunity. 484 U.S. at 227. The Thompson
court, however, did not perform the functional analysis. See 882 F.2d at 1189.
107. Lowe, 772 F.2d at 313. For cases in other circuits which hold that a
court clerk is absolutely immune when performing discretionary acts of a judi-
cial nature, see Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied,
469 U.S. 832 (1984); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1978).
108. Lowe, 772 F.2d at 313-14 (citing McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th
Cir. 1972)).
109. Id.
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prong.1 ° However, it remanded the case for further considera-
tion of whether there were extraordinary circumstances which
excused his conduct.11 '
The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the court
clerk was entitled to derivative absolute immunity because he
acted at the request of the judge." 2 The court reasoned that
immunity should not protect a clerk from liability if the clerk
knowingly engaged in unconstitutional conduct, even if the ac-
tion was taken pursuant to the judge's direction."i 3
In Eades v. Sterlinske,i i 4 the Seventh Circuit defined dis-
cretion broadly. In Eades, the plaintiff, a criminal defendant,
brought a § 1983 action"i5 against a court clerk and the state
court judge, alleging that they had falsely represented that an
instruction and special-verdict conference had been held." 6
The court concluded that the clerk's act of commission of en-
tering a false item on the docket sheet was a discretionary
act"i 7 because the act had an "integral relationship with the ju-
dicial process."' 1 8  Thus, the clerk was entitled to absolute
110. Id. at 314.
111. Id
112. Id. But see Heldstab v. Liska, No. 89-3323, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
15203, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 1990) (holding that court clerks are absolutely
immune when acting pursuant to a judge's instruction because it would be un-
fair to spare the judges who give orders while punishing the officers who obey
them).
113. Lowe, 772 F.2d at 314.
114. 810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
115. The plaintiff alleged a deprivation of her Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 725.
116. Id. at 724. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the judge dictated a
false certificate indicating that the conference had been held and told the
court clerk to alter the docket sheet record to indicate that he had filed the
certificate. Id. at 724-25.
117. Id. at 726.
118. Id The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the court clerk was abso-
lutely immune because the clerk exercised discretion and thus performed an
act which had an "integral relationship to the judicial process" is reminiscent
of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Ninth Circuit standard). However, while the Ninth Circuit con-
cludes that filing petition papers is a task which is an "integral part of the
judicial process," the Seventh Circuit suggests that only those acts which are
discretionary are an "integral part" of the judicial process and should be af-
forded absolute immunity. Eades, 810 F.2d at 726. Under its test of tasks
which are an "integral part of the judicial process," the Seventh Circuit proba-
bly would conclude that the court clerk in Mullis did not perform a task inte-
gral to the judicial process when filing papers because filing papers does not
require discretion. Thus, the Seventh Circuit probably would disagree with
the Ninth Circuit and conclude that the Ninth Circuit erred in according abso-
lute immunity to the court clerk in Mullis.
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immunity.119
The court briefly distinguished its earlier decision in
Lowe. °20 It explained that in Lowe the court clerk's duty to
send a notice after entry of judgment was a ministerial act be-
cause a statute required the clerk to perform the act. 2 ' For
this reason, the clerk was not entitled to absolute immunity for
his failure to perform his duty. In contrast, the Eades court
concluded that because the clerk breached his statutory duty
when he entered the false item on the docket sheet, he exer-
cised discretion. 2 2 Because the clerk exercised discretion, the
Eades court held that the clerk was entitled to absolute
immunity.m2s
III. AN ACT-BASED ANALYSIS OF COURT CLERK
IMMUNITY
Despite their disparate analyses,324 none of the circuits pre-
cludes a grant of immunity to court clerks for ministerial
119. Eades, 810 F.2d at 726.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. I&
123. Id. Rather than distorting the law to find that the court clerk per-
formed a discretionary task, the Eades court could have decided the case based
on derivative immunity and concluded that the court clerk was absolutely im-
mune on those grounds. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
124. The circuit courts' attempts to deal with the question of court clerk
immunity have resulted in mass confusion. Consider, for example, how the
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits would treat a court clerk's deliberate fal-
sification of a docket entry. Although both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
would grant absolute immunity to a court clerk who performed discretionary
tasks, they would disagree about whether the deliberate falsification of a
docket entry is a discretionary task. Focusing on whether performance of the
act requires discretion, the Fourth Circuit would conclude that the court clerk
was not absolutely immune because keeping an accurate docket is mandated
by statute and is thus ministerial. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying
text. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit would conclude that the court clerk was
absolutely immune because the clerk's decision to falsify the docket entry was
an act of commission, and acts of commission are discretionary under the Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18, 122-23.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also would find the court
clerk absolutely immune, but for different reasons. The Ninth Circuit would
grant absolute immunity to the court clerk regardless of whether the falsifica-
tion of a docket entry was a discretionary task as long as docket entry was
within the scope of the clerk's employment. See supra notes 93-96 and accom-
panying text. At the very least, the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all
would conclude that even if the court clerk were not entitled to absolute im-
munity for falsifying the docket entry, the court clerk may be qualifiedly im-
mune from liability. See supra notes 89, 96, 109-11 and accompanying text.
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acts. -5 Supreme Court decisions on immunity suggest, how-
ever, that courts should deny any immunity to court clerks for
ministerial acts which result in constitutional violations. Addi-
tionally, immunizing court clerks for ministerial acts conflicts
with the policy considerations underlying immunity. Only
when court clerks perform discretionary acts or acts pursuant
to a judge's order does Supreme Court precedent and policy
support awarding court clerks immunity.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND IMMUNITY FOR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MINISTERIAL ACTS
The Supreme Court has stated that courts must look to
whether immunity was available and firmly rooted in common
law prior to 1871 to determine the extent to which state and
federal officials are immune from civil liability for constitu-
tional violations.126 The Supreme Court has applied this test to
judges, prosecutors, jurors, and grand jurors.127 Court clerks
are a part of the same judicial process. Because no reason ex-
ists for treating clerks differently than other judicial officers,
this framework should govern court clerk immunity. Never-
theless, the circuit courts' analyses fail to apply this test. Only
the Fourth Circuit has looked to the existence of common law
immunity 2 8 in determining whether immunity is currently
available as a defense to unconstitutional ministerial acts.'2
125. The Ninth Circuit grants absolute immunity to court clerks for minis-
terial acts. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. Through a broad
definition of discretionary acts, the Seventh Circuit grants absolute immunity
to court clerks for ministerial acts which are acts of commission. See supra
notes 114-23 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit suggests that there
may be circumstances where a court clerk would be qualifiedly immune for
acts of omission. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. The Fourth
Circuit also left open the possibility that court clerks may be qualifiedly im-
mune for their acts. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972).
126. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
129. Even so, the Fourth Circuit was imprecise in its application of
Supreme Court precedent concerning the types of immunities which survive
the "every" person language of § 1983. The court stated that the immunities
which have been read into § 1983 derive from those existing at common law.
McCray, 456 F.2d at 4. The court then concluded that court clerks were not
absolutely immune because court clerks were not absolutely immune in 1899.
I& at 4 n.8.
Although cases after 1871 may be relevant in determining whether the
prevailing view of immunities for ministerial acts has substantially changed
since 1871, the Fourth Circuit also should have determined whether the abso-
lute immunity of court clerks was firmly rooted at common law at the time
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Court clerks should not be entitled to absolute or qualified
immunity for ministerial acts because court clerk immunity for
ministerial acts was not firmly rooted in common law at the
time Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1871, nor has the
prevailing view of immunity for ministerial acts changed sub-
stantially since 1871.130 Court clerks were sued repeatedly in
the years prior to 1871, and most courts held that court clerks
were not entitled to absolute immunity.131 Courts reasoned
that "every public officer ought to know his duty, and exercise
it with fidelity, or he will become responsible to the party
grieved."'132 Thus, prior to 1871, plaintiffs recovered damages
against court clerks for failure to perform the following minis-
terial acts: issue an execution, 33 docket cases in correct or-
der,' 34 enter judgments correctly,135 issue a citation in a timely
manner,136 search records properly,137 approve bonds with suf-
ficient sureties,ls 8 issue a writ of error secured by the proper
sureties, 139 and avoid unreasonable delays in delivering a
transcript.140
The fact that only a few courts before 1871 held that court
clerks were entitled to qualified immunity for ministerial acts
indicates that it was not firmly rooted at common law before
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1871. The common law status of court
clerk immunity was, in fact, the same before 1871 as after, and, therefore, the
Fourth Circuit reached the correct result. See supra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
130. The existence of immunity for court clerks prior to 1871 must be as-
sessed in terms of their immunity in the tort context. Constitutional actions
were not available prior to 1871 when the Civil Rights Act was passed. See
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)) (creating liability for constitutional violations by "every
person" acting under color of state law).
131. See supra notes 60-61, 64 (citing cases holding that court clerks were
not entitled to any immunity or, at the most, qualified immunity); see also in-
fra notes 132-40 (citing cases in which court clerks were assessed damages).
132. Work v. Hoofnagle, 1 Yeates 506, 508 (Pa. 1795).
133. See, e.g., State ex rel Mahoney v. Ritter, 20 Ind. 406, 408 (1863) (per
curiam); Briggs v. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356, 358 (1813); State ex rel. McIntyre v.
Merritt, 65 N.C. 558, 560 (1871); Gooch v. Gregory, 65 N.C. 142, 144 (1871).
134. See, e.g., Brown v. Lester, 12 Miss. (13 S. & M.) 392, 395 (1850).
135. See, e.g., Day v. Graham, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 435, 442 (1844); Planters' Bank
v. Conger, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 527, 531 (1849); Coyne v. Souther, 61 Pa. 455,
458 (1869).
136. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jouhett, 14 La. Ann. 614, 615 (1859).
137. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. 227, 228 (1849).
138. See, e.g., Ward v. Buell, 18 Ind. 104, 106 (1862); Pass v. Dibrell, 16
Tenn. (8 Yer.) 470, 473 (1835).
139. See, e.g., McNutt v. Livingston, 15 Miss. (7 S. & M.) 641, 649-50 (1846).
140. See Bates v. Foree, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 430, 432 (1868).
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1871.141 Further, the prevailing view of court clerk liability has
not changed substantially since Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act. Although some courts have departed from the gen-
eral common law view and granted court clerks absolute immu-
nity for ministerial acts, absolute immunity for ministerial acts
has by no means become the prevailing view.L42 Many courts
continue to hold court clerks liable for many ministerial acts
for which they were liable before 1871.143 For example, since
1871, court clerks have been held liable for their failure to rec-
ord judgments accurately,'" to furnish information regarding
judgments,14 5 to enter orders promptly,146 to index a notice of
lis pendens properly,147 to issue process correctly,14 to forward
transcripts in a timely fashion, 14 9  to distribute funds
promptly,150 to notify parties of the grant of a final order,151
and to file or record documents correctly.152
The non-existence of a "firmly rooted" absolute or quali-
fied common law immunity for court clerks, both before 1871
and after 1871, indicates that courts should neither grant abso-
lute immunity to court clerks for ministerial acts nor remand
for an inquiry into whether the court clerk is entitled to quali-
fied immunity due to an unclear law. Based on this initial in-
quiry, the circuits should not have concluded that an immunity
defense is available to court clerks.
Some may argue that the existence of a few courts which
granted qualified immunity to court clerks for their ministerial
acts, both before and after 1871, and the recent decisions grant-
ing court clerks absolute immunity for ministerial acts, suggest
141. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing cases).
142. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 67.
144. See, e.g., Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145, 152-53 (La. Ct. App.
1963); Whelan v. Reynolds, 112 N.W. 223, 229 (Minn. 1907); Cole v. Vincent, 242
N.Y.S. 644, 650 (App. Div. 1930); Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699
(Utah 1977).
145. See, e.g., Selover v. Sheardown, 76 N.W. 50, 51 (Minn. 1898).
146. See, e.g., Charco, Inc. v. Cohn, 411 P.2d 264, 266 (Or. 1966).
147. See, e.g., Hartwell v. Riley, 62 N.Y.S. 317, 320 (App. Div. 1900).
148. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Weedon, 78 F. 584, 590 (6th Cir. 1897).
149. See Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) (permitting
an action to be maintained against a court clerk for failure to forward a
transcript).
150. See, e.g., Martin v. Bogard, 2 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Ark. 1928).
151. See, e.g., Spector v. Hallan, 17 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (City Ct.), aff'd, 19
N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
152. Cain v. Gray, 142 S.W. 715, 718 (Ky. 1912); Progressive Bank & Trust
Co. v. Dieco Specialty, Inc., 378 So. 2d 139, 141 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Riverside
Transfer Co. v. Service Drayage Co., 135 So. 79, 80 (La. Ct. App. 1931).
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that there is no clear common law rule regarding court clerk
immunity.153 Additionally, the Supreme Court appears to be
moving away from the application of the 1871 test to qualified
immunity.15 Justice O'Connor has suggested that an inquiry
into the existence of common law immunities both before and
after 1871 is futile, especially when there was no prevailing rule
at common law. 55 In place of the 1871 test, Justice O'Connor
has urged courts to turn to the policies underlying § 1983. In
doing so, courts can determine which rule best furthers § 1983's
purposes of providing compensation to victims of constitutional
violations while deterring further violations. 1'
The principal policies underlying § 1983 are compensation
of victims for constitutional violations and deterrence of fur-
ther violations. 157 The goal of deterrence must be balanced by
the potential chill such deterrence will have on public officials
in the performance of their duties.'5 Holding court clerks lia-
ble for constitutional violations allows victims to seek compen-
sation for injuries caused by clerks and deters clerks from
further misconduct. The existence of liability as a deterrent
would not chill a court clerk's performance of her ministerial
acts because such acts do not allow for discretion. Liability for
ministerial acts thus furthers the policies underlying § 1983.
Moreover, the general policy justifications for awarding immu-
nity do not exist.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFYING IMMUNITY
Do NOT EXIST
In addition to failing to meet the policy objectives of § 1983,
providing immunity to court clerks who perform ministerial
acts violates policy concerns underlying immunity. Courts prin-
cipally grant immunity to ensure that public officials may exer-
cise discretion free from the fear of harassment or intimidation
that is created by the threat of liability.159 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has granted immunity to those public officials
who exercise discretion.160 Ministerial acts, which must be per-
153. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 54.
155. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 92-93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
157. Wade, 461 U.S. at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Id
159. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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formed and allow for no discretion,161 constitute the majority of
court clerk duties.162 Because court clerks do not exercise dis-
cretion when performing ministerial acts, immunity serves no
purpose. In fact, subjecting court clerks to liability, rather than
protecting them with immunity, will encourage the proper per-
formance of their duty.
1. Definition of Discretion for Purposes of Immunity
In defining discretion, courts should look to the policies un-
derlying immunity. Those policies mandate that courts focus
on the nature of the act the court clerk should have performed,
such as whether the clerk entered documents properly into the
docket, rather than the way the clerk performed the act.
In Eades, the Seventh Circuit ignored these policies by ap-
parently defining a discretionary act as an act of commission.'L6
The court reasoned that if a court clerk performs an act of com-
mission, the clerk exercises discretion even though the act
otherwise appears to be ministerial. Under the Seventh Cir-
cuit's definition, ministerial acts, such as entering true informa-
tion on a docket, become discretionary if the court clerk
chooses to falsify the entries. The Seventh Circuit would find
that such acts are discretionary because the court clerks had to
choose to breach their ministerial duties.16
By granting absolute immunity to clerks who engage in
acts of commission, the Seventh Circuit promotes the very be-
havior absolute immunity was intended to stop. Rather than
encouraging the official to perform her duties by protecting her
161. See supra notes 23, 30-35 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
163. Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S.
847 (1987). The Eades court held that a court clerk was entitled to absolute
immunity when he intentionally falsified the entry on a docket. Eades, 810
F.2d at 726. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Lowe v. Letsinger held that a
court clerk was not entitled to absolute immunity when he intentionally failed
to notify a prisoner of an order releasing him from jail. 772 F.2d 308, 313 (7th
Cir. 1985). Both the duty to keep an accurate docket and the duty to notify a
prisoner of his release are ministerial because they are statutory duties. The
only way to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's apparently conflicting decisions
is to note that the court clerk's failure to notify a prisoner of an order releas-
ing him from jail was an act of omission, whereas the court clerk's false entry
in the docket was an act of commission.
164. Eades, 810 F.2d at 726 ("Here, defendants . . . prepared and filed a
false certificate summarizing an instruction conference that allegedly was
never held, and altered the docket to reflect that falsity. In so doing, defend-
ants... breached their duties, and in that process exercised discretion.").
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from the threat of liability, the court encourages the breach of
statutory duties by providing immunity for acts of commission.
Additionally, the policies behind immunity do not justify
remanding the question of whether a court clerk is entitled to
qualified immunity for a ministerial act. Qualified immunity
protects those officials who are required to exercise discretion
when the law is unclear.165 Court clerks do not fall within the
group of public officials that qualified immunity is designed to
protect because the law setting forth a ministerial act is rarely
unclear.
Court clerks may argue that if they are not immune, they
will become a "lightning rod" for litigation because they will be
the only members of the court who are not immune.16 This
danger is exaggerated. The potential causes of action against
clerks are more limited than those against judges and other ju-
dicial officers because court clerk duties are well-defined and
do not require discretion. Further, this "lightning rod" concern
is not enough to override the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 1983, nor does it make up for the fact that the policy consider-
ations justifying the award of immunity to other participants in
the judicial process do not exist for court clerks performing
ministerial acts.
2. Lack of Procedural Safeguards
In addition, procedural safeguards will not protect the pub-
lic from unconstitutional conduct by court clerks in the same
way the safeguards protect the public from conduct by judicial
officers. The safeguards advanced by the Supreme Court re-
volve around the adversarial process, precedent, and the availa-
bility of appeal-none of which protect litigants from a clerk's
failure to perform ministerial tasks. 67 For example, in Mullis,
in which the court clerk allegedly filed a bankruptcy petition
incorrectly and refused to accept an amended petition, 68 the
court did not consider the importance of precedent, the nature
of the adversarial process, and the opportunity to correct error
165. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text; see also Ashbrook v.
Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[A] nonjudicial officer who is dele-
gated judicial duties in aid of the court should not be a 'lightning rod for
harassing litigation' aimed at the court." (quoting Kermit Constr. Corp. v.
Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976))).
167. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
168. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988).
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on appeal. As the court noted in Mullis, court clerks are re-
sponsible for accepting legal documents which initiate law-
suits.1 69 The above safeguards apply only after a lawsuit has
been initiated. They provide no recourse against a clerk whose
negligence blocked a lawsuit. Similarly, despite the adversarial
process, precedent, and the availability of appeal, the prisoner
in Lowe lost his freedom for three weeks because of the clerk's
failure to notify him of his release.
170
C. NARROW AREA IN WHICH COURT CLERKS ARE
ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE
1. Discretionary Acts
The Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits considered only
whether court clerks were immune for ministerial acts. Stat-
utes occasionally will permit court clerks to perform discretion-
ary acts. For example, when a statute authorizes a court clerk
to issue warrants, the court clerk must exercise discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists.17 ' Under Supreme
Court precedent, immunity is available for unconstitutional dis-
cretionary acts if immunity was "firmly rooted" and available
to defend against discretionary acts prior to 1871.172 Absolute
immunity was firmly rooted in common law before 1871 for dis-
cretionary acts performed by participants in the judicial pro-
cess,173 and this absolute immunity attaches to the act and not
to the title of the official.' 7 4 Court clerks, therefore, also
should be entitled to absolute immunity when performing dis-
cretionary acts.
2. Acts Pursuant to a Judge's Order
In addition to those duties delineated by statute, court
clerks also carry out judges' orders. 175 Court clerks are not en-
169. Id.
170. Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1985).
171. See, e.g., Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a court clerk is entitled to absolute immunity for issuing a warrant with-
out probable cause because he performed a function normally handled by a
judge-a function which required discretion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
172. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
175. State ex reL. Wanamaker v. Miller, 128 N.E.2d 108, 109 (Ohio 1955)
(noting that "the court has the power to order him either to file or to refuse to
file any matter presented to him"). In the performance of his duties as a min-
isterial officer of the court, the clerk is subject to the control of the court and
must obey the court's order. State ex reL Tolls v. Tolls, 85 P.2d 366, 373-74 (Or.
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titled to any immunity of their own to protect them from liabil-
ity when ministerial acts result in constitutional violations. It
is unfair, however, to hold a court clerk liable for acting pursu-
ant to a judge's order when the judge would be absolutely im-
mune for issuing the order. 76 It is similarly unfair to require a
court clerk to defend an action which the clerk is powerless to
control.177 Further, a court's failure to grant immunity to court
clerks acting pursuant to a judge's order would create tension
between judges and those officials responsible for enforcing
their orders. 178 If court officials were not immune, they would
face the choice of disregarding the judge's orders, thereby risk-
ing discharge or criminal contempt, or of fulfilling their duty at
the risk of being sued.179
Thus, court clerks should be entitled to absolute immunity
when they act pursuant to a judge's order. This absolute immu-
nity should derive from the judge's immunity; whether absolute
immunity is available to court clerks who acted pursuant to a
judge's order depends on whether the judge would be immune
for his conduct in a § 1983 action. 80 Because immunity for
judges was firmly rooted before 1871,181 court clerks may bor-
row this absolute immunity when acting pursuant to a judge's
order.
CONCLUSION
The immunity of court clerks lies in the hands of judges
who work under the same courthouse roof as do the clerks. To
date, judges have insulated themselves and the other people
with whom they work-witnesses, prosecutors, jurors, and
grand jurors-from liability.
Although court clerks play an important role in the judi-
cial process, these clerks should not be entitled to immunity for
ministerial acts but should be immune only when they perform
1938), overruled on other grounds, Burnett v. Hatch, 266 P.2d 414, 419 (Or.
1954) (en banc). Failure to do so may result in contempt proceedings. Id.; see
also supra note 24 (noting the different level of immunities afforded court
clerks acting pursuant to a judge's order).
176. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).
177. Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.
1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
181. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608), cited in Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
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a judicial function or an act pursuant to a judge's order. The
judicial system needs to be accountable for the actions of its
participants. A judicial process totally insulated from judicial
scrutiny ceases to promote, and even impedes, justice.
